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RESPONSE

WHOSE CONCEPTION OF INSURANCE?

STEVEN M. K LEPPER†
In response to Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013).
INTRODUCTION
Professor Abraham’s new Article, Four Conceptions of Insurance,1 oﬀers an
invaluable overview and critique of four modern conceptions of insurance.
He cautions that “the particular lens through which we view insurance law
cannot tell us what principles should govern or what policy choices to
make.”2 But who is the “we” in that statement? This Response focuses on
three overlooked groups with an important interest in such governing
principles and policy choices. First, Abraham mentions insurance brokers
only brieﬂy, describing how large insurance brokers can negotiate policy
terms.3 But brokers, large and small, play an important role in deciding
which available insurance a policyholder purchases. Second, any discussion
of homeowners insurance should include mortgage holders, who require
mortgagors to purchase insurance and whose interest in the scope of
coverage is equal to or greater than the homeowner’s. Third, within the
construction industry, general contractors seek to transfer risk to their
subcontractors, who must purchase liability policies naming general contractors
† Steven M. Klepper is a principal at Kramon & Graham, P.A., in Baltimore, Maryland, where
his practice focuses on general appellate litigation and insurance coverage. The views expressed in
this Response are his alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of his firm or its clients.
1 Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. P A . L. R EV . 653 (2013).
2 Id. at 698.
3 Id. at 660.
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as “additional insureds.” The contract model, which looks to the intent of
the insurer and the subcontractor, as expressed in the policy language,
preserves the expectations of the parties to the contract. In examining each
of these three overlooked groups’ interests in an insurance transaction, we
may discover that the contract model, so frequently maligned in the academic literature,4 is not so bad after all.
I. INSURANCE BROKERS
An insurance broker is an independent middleman who acts as the policyholder’s agent in placing insurance coverage.5 The broker, whose compensation comes from commissions on policy premiums, often is identiﬁed on
the policy’s declarations page.6 A broker’s role and interest in an insurance
transaction should inﬂuence our view of insurance.
Abraham, in his discussion of the contractual conception, notes that
“[f]or sizable businesses and other institutions, contractual intent and
understanding are potentially more plausible and meaningful notions.
These entities have access to attorneys and insurance brokers to advise
them.”7 Nevertheless, Abraham opines that the “notion of contractual intent
is often problematic,” observing that, in his experience, “commercial
policyholders’ own ‘experts’ frequently are not conversant with many of the
terms of the numerous insurance policies that their . . . clients purchase.”8
From my own anecdotal experience, that observation, although sometimes true, is overbroad. It rarely applies to industry-speciﬁc brokers. For
most any construction trade in a particular region, there are insurance
brokers who know their clients’ businesses and insurance needs. An insurer
looking to enter that market must do so through those brokers, who can
wield enormous inﬂuence. They can advocate particular endorsements to
broaden coverage beyond the standard commercial general liability (CGL)
policy, and they can resist endorsements designed to narrow coverage.
Just as Abraham necessarily relied on his personal experience, I have no
citations to support my observations. It is important for lawyers to remember, though, that they rarely receive a call when the policyholder has clearly
purchased the correct coverage for its loss. And there are some objective
4
5

See, e.g., id. at 667-68.
Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 T ORT T RIAL & INS. P RAC.
L.J. 1, 5 (2004); Colin Sammon, Comment, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability: Crossing the Two
Way Street, 29 O HIO N.U. L. R EV. 237, 240 (2002).
6 Richmond, supra note 5, at 6-7.
7 Abraham, supra note 1, at 660.
8 Id. at 660-61.
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markers of brokers’ sophistication and leverage in insurance transactions. On
the 2012 Fortune 500 list, the nation’s two largest insurance brokers, Marsh &
McLennan Companies and Aon, ranked 2319 and 235,10 respectively—higher
than all but a handful of casualty insurers.
Broker expertise does not just aid large corporate policyholders. Objective evidence indicates that small brokers’ expertise collectively gives
individual consumers leverage in the scope of coverage under homeowners
policies. Professor Daniel Schwarcz, one of the few academics studying the
role of brokers in the insurance marketplace, has concluded that broker
commission systems do not do enough to steer clients toward cost-eﬃcient
coverage.11 But his research indicates that brokers do aid homeowners in
selecting broader coverage, even if he believes that brokers do not do
enough. In a recent article, Schwarcz demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the terms of homeowners policies diﬀer considerably from
one insurer to the next.12 The breadth of coverage often turns on who places
the coverage: captive insurance agents, who are authorized to sell only one
insurer’s policies, or independent brokers. Speciﬁcally, Schwarcz found that
“the carriers who employ the least generous policy forms disproportionately
use captive agents to distribute their policies, whereas the companies with
unusually generous policies tend to rely on independent agents.”13 This
research indicates that independent brokers, working on behalf of policyholders, collectively can broaden the scope of coverage under homeowners
policies, or at least resist the narrowing of coverage.
The value of broker expertise is not measured merely by the ability to
negotiate the scope of coverage under a particular policy. Rather, brokers
who understand their clients’ needs can aid them in purchasing all of the
9 See Fortune 500: 231. Marsh & McLennan, CNNMONEY (May 21, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2012/snapshots/2402.html.
10 See Fortune 500: 235. Aon, CNNMONEY (May 21, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/
fortune/fortune500/2012/snapshots/2430.html.
11 See Daniel Schwarcz, Diﬀerential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” in Consumer
Insurance Markets, 15 C ONN. INS. L.J. 723, 726 (2009) (“[I]nsurers who rely on independent
agents to sell consumer lines of insurance should be prohibited from paying diﬀerent rates of
compensation to diﬀerent agents for the sale of the same line of insurance.”); Daniel Schwarcz,
Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 Y ALE L. & P OL'Y R EV. 289,
293-94 (2007) (“[A] disclosure requirement in consumer insurance markets is unlikely to address
meaningfully the core risk of contingent commissions—the potential for ineﬃcient steering.”).
12 Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. C HI . L. R EV . 1263,
1266 (2011).
13 Id. at 1277.
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appropriate policies or coverages. Most standard CGL exclusions correspond to other coverages available for purchase by the insured. Exclusions
for injuries “arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services” reﬂect that “professionals customarily have or are supposed
to have professional liability insurance, so that their services should not also
be covered by their general liability carrier.”14 Similarly, the CGL exclusion
for property damage to personal property in the care, custody, or control of
the insured corresponds to ﬁrst-party inland marine coverage for insureds
who handle third parties’ chattel.15
These coverages generally are not intended to overlap. If the broker
purchases multiple primary-layer policies applying to the same risk, then it
is not doing right by its policyholder. Primary-layer insurance carries higher
premiums than higher-layer excess or umbrella insurance.16 If an insured
wants additional coverage for a particular risk, it is far more economical to
purchase an excess or umbrella policy.
Just as a good broker can bring great value to policyholders, there are
legal remedies for a broker’s deﬁcient performance. When a policy fails to
provide the coverage that the policyholder thought it purchased, the
policyholder frequently will look to the broker to address that shortfall.17
And, although the default rule is that brokers have no duty to advise their
clients regarding their insurance needs, brokers in some circumstances may
assume (expressly or impliedly) such a duty.18 The policyholder may fare
better in court against the broker than against the insurer if reading the
policy would have disclosed a gap in coverage. In many jurisdictions, the
failure to read a policy is not a defense in a failure-to-procure action against
the broker, if the policyholder can establish reasonable reliance on the broker’s

14
15

Harbor Ins. Co. v. Omni Constr., Inc., 912 F.2d 1520, 1521, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
See Customized Distribution Servs. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 862 A.2d 560, 561-63 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2004) (noting that the insured “obtained the [warehouseman’s liability] coverage to
ﬁll the gap created by the ‘care, custody, and control exclusion’ contained in the CGL policy”).
16 See Scott M. Seaman & Charlene Kittredge, Excess Liability Insurance: Law and Litigation,
32 T ORT & INS. L.J. 653, 657 (1997) (“The premium paid by the insured for each successive layer
of coverage is usually proportionately less expensive than for the immediately underlying layer.”).
17 See generally 1 A LLAN D. W INDT , I NSURANCE C LAIMS AND D ISPUTES : R EPRESENTATION OF I NSURANCE C OMPANIES AND I NSUREDS § 6:44, at 494 (3d ed. 1995) (“[I]f a
policy does not provide the coverage that the insured hired the broker to obtain, and the broker
does not apprise the insured of that fact, the insured may have a remedy against the broker for the
equivalent of the missing policy beneﬁt in the event of a later occurrence that was supposed to
have been, but was not, covered.”).
18 Richmond, supra note 5, at 26 & nn.194-96, 27 & n.197.
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expert review of the policy.19 There is insurance available for the breach of a
broker’s duties—a broker’s own errors-and-omissions liability insurance.20
To me, then, two propositions seem clear. First, brokers have the obligation to know the coverage they place. Second, when brokers meet that
obligation, they can exercise great inﬂuence over whether their clients have
coverage for losses when they arise. Critics of the contract model protest
that brokers regularly fail to meet this threshold obligation. Whether or not
that perception is accurate, a broker’s undereducation does not mean that
his client lacks bargaining power. Rather, it indicates that the broker has
failed to exercise his client’s bargaining power. It seems quite a leap, then,
to require an insurer to provide coverage where a careful review of the
policy would have shown no coverage.21 A reasonable observer could
conclude instead that policyholders and state regulators should take a
greater interest in brokers’ “trustworthiness and competence.”22
II. M ORTGAGE H OLDERS
Abraham addresses homeowners policies in some detail, but he only
brieﬂy mentions mortgage holders.23 Mortgagees have just as much economic interest as do homeowners in the scope of coverage for property
losses. The Federal Reserve Board estimates that, as of the ﬁrst quarter of
2013, owners hold approximately 49.2% equity in their household real

19
20

See id. at 43-45 (surveying the law regarding policyholders’ duty to read their policies).
See generally Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation, Insurance Agents’ and Brokers’ Professional
Liability Insurance, 55 A.L.R.5th 681 (1998) (providing an overview of coverage issues under such
professional liability policies).
21 Compare Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
H ARV. L. R EV. 961, 967 (1970) (“The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and
intended beneﬁciaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.”), with Wilkie
v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 783 (Mich. 2003) (“Whether Professor Keeton
intended this analysis to spawn a frontal assault on the ability of our citizens to manage, by
contract, their own aﬀairs, it had that eﬀect because numerous courts, to one degree or another,
adopted some form of the rule.”).
22 See Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 450 (1946) (endorsing the requirement that a
surplus line broker’s license issue only after a ﬁnding of “trustworthiness and competence” by the
state insurance commissioner as “an appropriate means of safeguarding the public against the
obvious evils arising from the lack of those qualiﬁcations”).
23 Compare Abraham, supra note 1, at 663, 676-78 (discussing first-party homeowners coverage),
with id. at 677 (briefly mentioning the relationship between mortgages and construction loans).
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estate,24 meaning that mortgagees hold a slight majority of equity. No one
would contend that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or the nation’s large banks lack
bargaining power. Any conceptual model for property insurance should account
for the prominent interest that mortgagees hold in the scope of coverage.
The prevalence of homeowners insurance is owed to the fact that mortgage holders require homeowners to carry such insurance.25 The Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), in setting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
guidelines for purchasing mortgages on the secondary market, heavily
inﬂuences the terms of homeowner mortgages,26 including requirements for
homeowners insurance.27 FHFA requires insurance “against loss or damage
from ﬁre and other hazards”—such as “wind, civil commotion (including
riots), smoke, hail, and damages caused by aircraft, vehicle, or explosion”—
“covered by the standard extended coverage endorsement.”28
Since before Fannie Mae’s creation in 1938,29 property insurance policies
have contained standard clauses giving mortgagees certain rights.30 As these
clauses have developed, a mortgagee is not within the deﬁnition of “the
24 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS
109 tbl.B.100 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf.
25 See Kenneth S. Klein, When Enough Is Not Enough: Correcting Market Ineﬃciencies in the
Purchase and Sale of Residential Property Insurance, 18 VA. J. S OC. P OL’Y & L. 345, 351 (2011)
(noting that “having a mortgage equates to having homeowner's insurance”). For a standard
insurance clause in a California mortgage, see id. at 388, which states, “All insurance policies
required by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lender’s right to disapprove
such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or
as an additional loss payee . . . .” (citation omitted). For a sample clause in a commercial
mortgage, see Gary A. Goodman & Bella Shirin, Understanding Insurance Vocabulary in Loan
Transactions, 129 B ANKING L.J. 22, 48 (2012):

All insurance policies shall be endorsed in form and substance acceptable to Agent to
name Agent on behalf of the Banks as an additional insured, loss payee or mortgagee
thereunder, as its interest may appear, with loss payable to Agent on behalf of the Banks,
without contribution, under a standard New York (or local equivalent) mortgagee clause.
26 See Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 Y ALE J.
R EG. 143, 196 (2009) (discussing how government-sponsored entities like Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, prodded by congressional Democrats, were able to eliminate binding mandatory
arbitration provisions from mortgages).
27 Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 1316.
28 Id. at 1317 (quoting F ANNIE M AE , S ELLING G UIDE : F ANNIE M AE S INGLE F AMILY
863 ( Jan. 27, 2011), available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/sel012711.pdf).
29 See, e.g., Raymond C. Niles, Eighty Years in the Making: How Housing Subsidies Caused the
Financial Meltdown, 6 J.L. E CON. & P OL’Y 165, 168 (2010) (“In 1938, the [National Housing] Act
created the Federal National Mortgage Association, now known as Fannie Mae, to purchase
mortgage loans from banks and securitize them.”).
30 See Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 65 F. 165, 167 (8th Cir. 1894) (quoting the full text of a
“union mortgage clause”).
ON
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insured,” but rather has rights as a payee.31 Under a standard mortgage clause,
an insurer will pay an innocent mortgagee’s otherwise covered claim even if
the policyholder breaches a condition of coverage.32
In a well-functioning market, therefore, mortgagees’ interest in the
scope of coverage should cause them to demand insurance policies that
provide an economically optimal scope of coverage. As we know all too well
from the ﬁnancial meltdown of 2008, however, mortgage holders generally
are more concerned with quickly selling mortgages on the secondary market
than with holding on to stable income-creating mortgages. Thus, in his
study of how certain insurers issue narrower-than-standard homeowners
coverage, Schwarcz argues against the notion that mortgage holders “police
against ineﬃcient coverage restrictions.”33 Professor Kenneth Klein, in
examining why so many homeowners policies carry insuﬃcient policy limits,
has described how incentives to underinsure create market ineﬃciencies.34
Neither of these observations, however, applies to the scope of covered
loss under a standard “all-risk” homeowners policy special form 3 (HO3).35
Klein addresses the amount of money available to pay a covered loss, not
the scope of coverage under the policy language. Schwarcz’s objection is
that mortgage holders and government regulators have failed to prevent
certain large national carriers from issuing policies that “are substantially worse
than the presumptive industry default of the 1999 [Insurance Services Oﬃce]
HO3 form.”36
Where a policy does in fact incorporate a standard HO3 form, there is
reason to believe that the scope of coverage under the policy language is the
product of a reasonably well-functioning market. Standard “all-risk” homeowners forms have been evolving over a long period of time, and a 1960s
homeowners policy (while less detailed) is recognizable when compared to a

31 See Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 148 A. 252, 254-55 (Md. 1930)
(contrasting decisions under homeowners policies with auto insurance contract that deﬁned
“assured” to include lender).
32 L EE R. R USS & T HOMAS F. S EGALLA , C OUCH ON I NSURANCE 3 D §§ 65:48–65:49
(2011); John W. Steinmetz et al., The Standard Mortgage Clause in Property Insurance Policies, 33
T ORT & INS. L.J. 81, 83 & n.11 (1997).
33 Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 1316.
34 See Klein, supra note 25, at 367-72.
35 For standalone homes, the most prevalent form is the 1999 version of the HO3 form
promulgated by the Insurance Services Oﬃce. See Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 1273, 1277.
36 Id. at 1277, 1314-17.
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modern policy.37 It seems unlikely that standard forms would deviate
signiﬁcantly from what mortgage holders, when paying attention, think to
be essential terms of coverage. Viewed through that lens, the standard
homeowners policy does not appear to be the product of unequal bargaining
power between individual homeowners and insurers, but rather a reﬂection
of the scope of coverage that mortgage holders ﬁnd economically justiﬁed.
III. G ENERAL C ONTRACTORS
In the construction industry, a general contractor typically will require
that its subcontractors’ CGL insurance policies name the general contractor
as an “additional insured” with respect to the subcontractor’s work.38 When
the general contractor is sued for defective construction or for on-site
bodily injury, it typically will demand that each of its subcontractors’
insurers defend and indemnify it as an additional insured.
But the subcontractor may not want its insurer to pay where coverage is
questionable, or to pay a disproportionate share of the general contractor’s
defense or indemnity. As one commentator has noted, “Every time his
insurance becomes involved to defend or pay a judgment, the subcontractor
must pay his deductible and further faces the possibility of escalating
premiums and diluting policy limits to pay his own costs and judgments.”39
The question of the scope of coverage for the general contractor’s claim
goes to the very heart of insurance. The essence of an insurance contract is
that the insured pays a premium in exchange for the insurer assuming a
speciﬁed risk.40 While in the ordinary insurance relationship, the risk of
increased premiums deters the insured from engaging in risky activity, “the
additional insured is insulated against this prospect by the fact that it is not
responsible for premium payments to the insurer and is unaﬀected by the
raising of premiums.”41
37 Compare Samuel v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 181 So. 2d 243, 245 (La. Ct.
App. 1965) (quoting from standard form), with Homeowners Composite Form: Section I – Perils
Insured Against (presenting a modern composite HO3 form), in SUSAN J. M ILLER, M ILLER’S
S TANDARD INSURANCE P OLICIES A NNOTATED (6th ed. 2011).
38 See generally P HILIP L. B RUNER & P ATRICK J. O’C ONNOR , J R ., B RUNER AND
O’C ONNOR ON C ONSTRUCTION L AW § 11:151 ( 2013).
39 Trisha Strode, Note, From the Bottom of the Food Chain Looking Up: Subcontractors Are Finding that Additional Insured Endorsements Are Giving Them Much More than They Bargained for, 23 S T.
L OUIS U. P UB. L. R EV. 697, 698 (2004).
40 In re Tex. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., Inc., 169 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2005) (“The payment of the
premium by the insured and the assumption of a speciﬁed risk by the insurer are the essential
elements of the contract of insurance.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
41 Samir B. Mehta, Comment, Additional Insured Status in Construction Contracts and Moral
Hazard, 3 C ONN. INS. L.J. 169, 186-87 (1996).
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Thus, when a dispute turns on the existence or scope of “additional
insured” coverage, contract law looks to the intentions of the policyholder
(who paid the premium) and of the insurer, as expressed in the language of
the policy, not to the expectations of the putative additional insured.42 The
contractual model of insurance thereby operates to protect the interests of
the policyholder.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota’s recent decision in Engineering &
Construction Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co.,43 reﬂects this dynamic. The
general contractor for a sewer pipeline sued its subcontractor and the
subcontractor’s CGL insurer for repairs that the general contractor had to
make after one of the subcontractor’s metal sheets damaged the pipe.44 A
jury determined that the subcontractor was not negligent,45 but the general
contractor asserted that the subcontractor was still liable under the indemnity
provisions of its subcontract, and that the subcontractor’s insurer was liable
under the policy’s “additional insured” endorsement.46 The case drew a
number of amicus curiae briefs,47 including one submitted by state and
national subcontractors’ associations.48 That brief did not merely argue for
the subcontractors’ position on contractual indemnity, but claimed more

42 See Leamington Co. v. Nonproﬁts’ Ins. Ass’n, 615 N.W.2d 349, 354-55 (Minn. 2000)
(explaining that a reformation claim by a third party asserting “additional insured” status turns on
the intentions of the insurer and named insured); Christenberry v. Tipton, 160 S.W.3d 487, 494
(Tenn. 2005) (commenting that “when interpreting an insurance policy, . . . a cardinal rule is that
a court must attempt to ascertain and give eﬀect to the intent of the parties”); see also One Beacon
Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc., 648 F.3d 258, 272 (5th Cir. 2011) (parsing the language of
the insurance policy and concluding that an unnamed third party was not an additional insured);
W INDT, supra note 17, § 4:05, at 181 (noting that, notwithstanding the ordinary rule that the
allegations of the underlying tort complaint control whether the liability insurer has a defense
obligation, “[s]everal courts . . . have held that the insurer is not obligated to provide a defense for
a stranger merely because the plaintiﬀ alleges facts that, if true, would make the stranger an
additional insured as deﬁned in the policy”).
43 825 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. 2013).
44 Id. at 698-701.
45 Id. at 701.
46 Id. at 702.
47 See Minnesota Appellate Court Issues in Briefs, M INN . S T . L. L IBR ., http://mn.gov/lawlib/
briefs/a������sc.html (last visited Nov. �, ����) (listing the amicus briefs ﬁled in the case). By way
of disclosure, I authored an amicus brief for the American Insurance Association. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae The American Insurance Ass’n, Eng’g & Constr., 825 N.W.2d 695 (No. A11-0159),
2012 WL 7160265.
48 See Brief of Amicus Curiae The American Subcontractors Ass’n of Minnesota & The
American Subcontractors Ass’n, Eng’g & Constr., 825 N.W.2d 695 (No. A11-0159), 2012 WL
7160266.
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broadly that the insurer’s “additional insured” endorsement should be construed
narrowly.49 The court ruled for both the subcontractor and the insurer.50
Insurance coverage disputes do not always ﬁt a policyholder-versusinsurer narrative. Diﬀerent insureds (or putative insureds) may ask a court to
adopt competing interpretations of an insurance policy. A contract approach,
which gives the words in a policy their objectively reasonable meaning,
therefore provides the most workable means of resolving such disputes.
CONCLUSION
The literature regarding alternative conceptions of insurance focuses on
the perceived shortcomings of the contractual model.51 Examining the roles
of brokers, mortgage holders, and general contractors, however, puts those
critiques in a diﬀerent light. Brokers have a duty to know the coverage they
place, and they have every incentive to ensure that their clients purchase
the appropriate range of available coverages. Given mortgage holders’
longstanding interest in the scope of coverage under homeowners policies,
standard policies may be fairly close to the ideal economic balance. Disagreements between general contractors and subcontractors regarding the
scope of coverage under “additional insured” endorsements demonstrate the
value of measuring coverage by the language of the contract. Abraham’s
article invites a dialogue about what we want from insurance, and I hope
that the dialogue will appreciate the value of understanding who “we” are.
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49
50
51

Id. at 15-16.
Eng’g & Constr., 825 N.W.2d at 710, 714.
See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 1, at 667-68.

